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ABSTRACT  French policy-makers have been caught in a dilemma with regard to the 
construction of the Economic governance (EG) dimension of EMU between two strong but 
contradictory preferences: on the one hand the supranational consequences of a dirigiste 
approach to macro-economic policy and, on the other hand, a Gaullist reflex to retain 
sovereignty as much as possible and to insist upon intergovernmentalism in EU-level 
macroeconomic policy-making. Since the late 1980s, French governments have promoted the 
construction of EG in ways which can be seen in terms of these contradictory preferences, 
while challenging the official Treaty-based ‘price stability’ goals of EG. The Raffarin 
Government supported the March 2005 reform of the Stability and Growth Pact (Stability 
Pact, SP) because it rendered the Pact more flexible allowing greater margin of manoeuvre in 
the development and implementation of the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG) and 
the application of the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP). EG has thus involved less ‘top-
down’ Europeanization and ‘transformation’ of French policy than ‘bottom-up’ 
Europeanization, ‘accommodation’ and ‘absorption’. 
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 Introduction 
Leading French politicians and academics have, since the start of discussions on the shape of 
the EMU design in 1988, been the principal proponents of the establishment of some form of 
‘gouvernement économique’ (economic governance (EG)) at the EU level. Economic 
governance has ostensibly and rhetorically been presented as a counter-balance to the 
monetary policy-making power of the European Central Bank (ECB).  It has also been 
presented as a means of encouraging coordinated reflation among EU Member States to 
ensure economic growth. At the same time EU economic governance has been used as a 
justification for domestic structural reform: a useful external constraint for French 
governments hamstrung by financial constraints and domestic political opposition to 
structural (notably pensions) reform. All French governments have defended the broader 
objectives of the Maastricht Treaty and Stability Pact (SP) rules (to prevent the unsustainable 
increase in the public debt load). However, French governments have also refused to accept 
the binding nature of the precise fiscal policy rules that are meant to reinforce the price 
stability goals of EU economic governance. These rules are not allowed to constrain French 
policy making when they are inconvenient.  
  This paper is thus a case study of the difficult acceptance of ‘Europeanization’ in 
France both in terms of the policies pursued by French governments but also in terms of their 
adopted discourse. French policy and discourse on economic governance provides an 
excellent example of how successive French governments have retained an idea of European 
Integration ‘à la carte’: they maintain a discourse in favour further integration, provide little 
substance as to what that means and are not actually committed to respect the rules they have 
previously accepted. This paper analyses the diversity of ways in which French policy makers 
have presented the concept of European ‘gouvernement économique’. This concept has been 
manipulated – beyond the core EMU goals of price stability (the stated aim of 
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subject to this stability, economic growth – to cover: 
1) economic policy coordination with other member state governments and with the ECB to 
achieve an 'appropriate' policy mix; 
2) a more energetic EU-level interventionism designed to stimulate economic growth and 
create jobs;  
3) the reinforcement of EMU’s credibility and legitimacy; 
4) an explicit challenge to the ECB's goals and goal-setting and operational independence.  
 
The inconsistent and often incoherent presentation of the concept of EG by leading members 
of the French political class reflects the inherent contradiction between two well-established 
French policy making preferences.  On the one hand, the consequences of a dirigiste approach 
in the context of EMU encourages French governments to match the single monetary policy 
with some form of supranational economic governance that can bring about a tight 
coordination of national macroeconomic policies but also serve as a potentially useful device 
to empower French governments in the domestic political and economic context. On the other 
hand, the Gaullist reflex to retain national policy making margin of manoeuvre (‘sovereignty’) 
as far as possible is manifested in the preference that EU-level policy making is conducted in 
an intergovernmental manner. The difficulty elaborating a clear French policy on EG has thus 
reflected the incoherence in French policy on European integration more broadly and the 
failure of French governments to move beyond the divisive questions of principle (‘should we 
transfer sovereignty?’) to the more consensual challenge of managing such change: not 
‘whether’ but ‘how’ to transfer sovereignty (Arnaud 2000; Drake 2001). 
The ‘price stability’ function embodied by the Maastricht Treaty’s convergence 
criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact (Stability Pact, SP) has consistently been 
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Plural-Left) discourse and policy on EU economic governance precisely because of the 
ostensibly binding nature of this function. The emphasis placed on the other forms of 
economic governance – notably as ‘policy mix’ and ‘intervention’ but also as political 
representation of the Euro-zone and even as political control over monetary policy – reflect 
more the domestic political and economic tradition – crucial to government-legitimisation in 
France – of volontarisme (or dirigisme), that is active – at least ostensibly active – state 
intervention in the economy.1 While the price stability dimension of European economic 
governance has conformed to the preferences of French governments seeking to push through 
significant structural reforms to lower the French public spending deficit and contain the 
rising debt burden, the rigid design of the SP rules has contradicted French preferences in 
favour of intergovernmentalism and margin of manoeuvre in macroeconomic policy making. 
The Pact was accepted by the Juppé Government (1995-1997) only after lengthy and bitter 
debate (Heipertz and Verdun 2004; Milesi 1998) to meet intransigent German demands and 
ensure the start of Stage Three of EMU. Thus the repeated failure of French governments to 
follow the existing rules of EU-level economic governance and the Broad Economic Policy 
Guidelines (BEPG) established for France should not be seen as a reconceptualisation of 
French preferences with regard to economic governance. The French government’s Pact 
reform proposals and its support for the elements of the March 2005 reforms demonstrate the 
preference for more flexible SP rules, the application of which should be subject to national 
political and economic considerations. The elaborate nature of the potential flexibility in the 
application of the reformed SP’s rules thus embodies the French paradox of wanting EG yet 
insisting upon intergovernmental policy making and margin of manoeuvre. 
                                                 
1  Volontarisme can be equated with dirigisme which Schmidt has defined as ‘a set of 
interventionist policies and directive policy-making processes’ (Schmidt 1997, 229) with the 
state actively steering the economic (industrial and so on) development of the economy (see 
also Hall 1986; Schonfield 1969).  
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EMU, Economic Governance and Europeanization 
In terms of the relevance of the diverse literature on Europeanization with regard to France 
and European integration, two conclusions can be drawn from the argument made here about 
EU-level economic governance and national margin of manoeuvre. The first concerns the 
description of EMU as ‘transformative’. The second concerns an application of the concept of 
Europeanization as a two way process that is ‘bottom up’ and ‘top down’ (Börzel 2002). In 
her study of the impact of EU adjustment pressures on policy sectors in the member states, 
Schmidt (2002) applies Radaelli’s (2000) analytical framework of Europeanization in terms of 
the scope of domestic change to several domestic policy sectors. This framework includes the 
concepts of transformation, accommodation, absorption, retrenchment (‘negative’ change) 
and inertia (resistance) (see also Heritier et a l. 2001; Cowles, Caporaso and Risse 2001). 
Schmidt argues that EMU is the only EU policy area which has ‘transformed’ French policy 
and policy making. In all other areas (for example, financial services, electricity, air transport, 
railways and road haulage) there has been either been absorption or inertia. 
  With regard to EMU, the ‘transformation’ that Schmidt outlines disguises 
developments which have worked to increase government margin of manoeuvre rather than 
decrease it. Rather than restricting the macroeconomic framework in which French 
governments must operate, EMU has actually decreased constraints on French governments. 
There is greater margin of manoeuvre in fiscal (and other macroeconomic policies) despite (or 
even because) of the Stability Pact. As EMU removes the possibility of speculation against 
national currencies, greater deficits are less problematic in the short-term for governments in 
managing their macro-economic policy as they are effectively sheltered by the single 
currency. The most restrictive element of the EU fiscal rules (notably the 3 per cent deficit 
limit) was until the 1990s not seen as particularly constraining for French policy makers given 
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When respecting these fiscal rules became politically difficult from 1993, French 
governments tried to change them. After the start of EMU’s Stage III, it became possible to 
flout and then change them (the March 2005 reforms) to ensure continued margin of 
manoeuvre. ECB interest rates, which decreased with the start of EMU, have far better 
conformed to French economic preferences than under the European Monetary System (EMS) 
– despite repeated criticism of ECB monetary policy making by French governments. The SP 
– created ostensibly to restrain the spending of profligate governments – in fact increased 
adjustment time for governments. The appearance of budgetary restraint – at least in the early 
years of EMU – built credibility for EMU and national macroeconomic policy (Jones 2000). 
Thus ‘transformation’ in the realm of monetary policy has, at best, allowed for 
‘accommodation’ and ‘absorption’ in fiscal and macro-economic policies and at worse 
‘retrenchment’ – higher budget deficits and debt load – and ‘inertia’ – failure to engage in 
structural reform. 
Börzel (2002) is helpful to this analysis because of a pertinent distinction between 
‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ Europeanization. Furthermore, an application of the concepts of 
‘pace-setting, foot-dragging or fence-sitting’ further demonstrates the interaction of French 
fiscal and macro-economic policy preferences and policy on EU-level economic 
governance.2 German CDU-CSU governments engaged in ‘pace-setting’ on the fiscal policy 
rules and macro-economic policy framework of EMU, while French governments engaged 
either in ‘fence-sitting’ – as on the design of the convergence criteria in the early 1990s – or 
‘foot-dragging’ – as on the independence of the ECB and the creation of the Stability Pact. 
                                                 
2 Börzel (2002: 194) defines these three strategies as follows. Pace-setting is ‘actively pushing 
policies at the European level, which reflect a Member State’s policy preference and 
minimize implementation costs’. Foot-dragging is ‘blocking or delaying costly policies in 
order to prevent them altogether or achieve at least some compensation for implementation 
costs’.  Fence-sitting is ‘neither systematically pushing policies nor trying to block them at the 
European level but building tactical coalitions with both pace-setters and foot-draggers’. 
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with regard to the reform of EU-level economic governance. French governments sought 
certain EU-level developments (‘pace-setting’) because they were seen to complement French 
state action and domestic economic objectives (to achieve a ‘goodness of fit’) which lowered 
the implementation costs at the national level (Börzel 2002: 194). Member states seek to 
‘upload’ national policy arrangements to maximise the benefits and minimise the costs of 
European policies of ‘downloading’. For Héritier et al. (1996) member states ‘compete at the 
European level for policies that conform to their own interest and approach’ (Börzel 2002: 
194). Thus, French governments have sought EU-imposed goals – Europeanization as ‘tying 
one’s hands’ through a deliberately developed external constraint – but all French 
governments have also opposed tightly binding rules that eliminate national margin of 
manoeuvre in national fiscal and macro-economic policy making. A coincidence of French 
and German preferences between 2003 and 2005 created a window in which French ‘pace-
setting’ resulted in desired policy change on the Stability Pact. 
  
French visions of EU-level ‘gouvernement économique’ 
The issue of economic governance has been raised by the French more than any other Euro-
zone member state: a preoccupation that reflects concerns linked to the traditionally 
widespread reluctance to accept central bank independence, the tradition of state 
interventionism in the economy and the 'sound money' bias of EMU. Since the start of 
negotiations on the EMU project in the late 1980s, the issue of EG has been constantly present 
in French political discourse and policy demands at the European level. The term 'economic 
governance' can signify several different things. In general terms, EG is an institutional set up 
at the European level that is designed to establish some form of macro-economic policy, be it 
only 'soft' / non-binding economic policy coordination, that has direct impact upon the 
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actors from several institutions and bodies in a multi-faceted network which is constituted by 
mutual participation patterns' that can be called horizontal fusion (Wessels & Linsenmann 
2001). In the academic literature — describing what has been created or recommending what 
should be created – this includes different modes of governance: the 'hard' coordination in the 
realm of monetary and fiscal policies and the 'soft' coordination in the area of economic and 
employment policies.  
What various French proponents mean exactly when they espouse EG has been 
unclear even though there has been a limited attempt by French academics and government 
economic advisors to explore possible EG scenarios (see, notably, Boyer 1999; Boyer and 
Dehove 2001). Different governments — indeed different policy makers — place different 
emphasis on different kinds of coordination and the appropriate role to be fulfilled by the 
Eurogroup. Five objectives of 'economic governance' – some overlapping; some contradicting 
– can be discerned from French policy statements over the past fifteen years. These all relate 
to the objective of EG that was explicitly established by the Maastricht Treaty and the SP:  
EG as coordination of macroeconomic policies to achieve greater price stability – to support 
fiscal policy coordination (which is supposed to involve binding rules and even fines). Thus 
EG was expected to reinforce the primary objective – low inflation – of the ECB (with 
economic growth and employment as a secondary objective), promote a positive coordination 
role between Ecofin and the ECB and prevent individual member states ‘free-riding’ off the 
low inflation achieved by the central bank and other Euro-zone member states. EG as the 
achievement of price stability has involved the supposedly 'hard' coordination of the 
convergence criteria rules (with rules for the imposition of fines established in the Stability 
Pact) and ‘soft’ coordination consisting of the mutual surveillance of national macroeconomic 
policies begun in Stage One of EMU in 1990 with the establishment of Broad Economic 
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reports, which was reinforced by Regulation 1466/97 of the SP that established the Stability 
and Convergence Programmes. For economists, the price stability elements of the treaty and 
the SP are designed to prevent the dangers of a ‘chicken game’ between fiscal and monetary 
authorities and of certain participating states ‘free riding’ off the stability achieved by other 
member states. 
 
Economic governance as ‘effective policy mix’ 
No French politician would claim that EG exists only to achieve price stability. Thus this 
understanding of EG associated with the application of Maastricht Treaty and SP rules is 
always presented in the context of EG as achieving an ‘effective policy mix’ which aims to 
promote a more active coordination of member state policies to increase economic growth and 
employment creation in the context of the ‘sound money’ goals of the EMU project. This is 
about qualifying / counterbalancing – but not directly challenging – the drive for monetary 
stability. This form of EG would involve a positive coordination between the Council and the 
ECB.  Such emphasis on effective policy mix can either involve an acceptance of an ECB 
(monetary policy) leadership role (thus the Council places clear limits on its pursuit of 
improved economic growth and this does not become inflationary) or a direct challenge to this 
role, emphasising instead the need for a tighter coordination of national macroeconomic 
policies (although not necessarily via precise binding rules) to achieve stronger economic 
growth and employment creation.  French government rhetoric and policy has presented both 
these forms of ‘policy mix’ while tending to favour the latter. 
    Initial French interest in EU-level economic governance – in the context of the 
discussions and negotiations on EMU in the late 1980s to the final agreement on the design of 
EMU at the December 1991 Maastricht Summit – stemmed in large part from widespread 
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monetary policy in a broader macroeconomic policy established by governments. Pierre 
Bérégovoy, Minister of Finance from 1988-1992, sought to counter what he saw as the 
excessive influence of the national central bank governors in the design of EMU (Howarth 
2001). During the period following the first meetings of the Delors Committee, Bérégovoy 
and Treasury officials introduced the idea of 'gouvernement économique'. In the French draft 
treaty of January 1991 they insisted: 
 
Everywhere in the world, central banks in charge of monetary policy are in 
dialogue with the governments in charge of the rest of economic policy. Ignore 
the parallelism between economic and monetary matters ... and this could lead to 
failure.3
 
Moreover, the Treasury proposed that the European Council, on the basis of Ecofin Council 
reports, define the broad orientations for EMU and the economic policy of the Community. 
Within these orientations, Ecofin would co-ordinate the policies of member states and make 
recommendations to individual governments and the ECB would manage European monetary 
policy. Bérégovoy and Treasury officials also argued in favour of giving the ministers of 
economics and finance control over exchange rate policy.4 The French draft treaty sought to 
limit the European bank’s margin of manoeuvre as much as possible.5 The draft treaty also 
very much reflects Treasury attitudes regarding the goal of price stability and French 
monetary policy tradition. It maintains a double language in favour of both the primacy of 
                                                 
3 For a copy of the French Draft Treaty see Revue Financière Internationale: aujourd'hui 
l'écu, numéro spécial, June 1991; and Agence Europe, 28/29.1.91, 5419. 
4 Communiqué du Conseil des Ministres, 5.12.90 and the French proposal for an EMU treaty, 
Agence Europe, 28/29.1.91, 5419. 
5 Agence Europe, ibid., 5419.  
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challenge this primacy. The Germans opposed any powers to the Council beyond ensuring 
that the member states respect the specific convergence criteria they sought to place in the 
EMU treaty. Ironically, given subsequent French government difficulties keeping the deficit 
below 3 per cent, French negotiators were flexible on the inclusion of the convergence criteria 
and even proposed the precise 3 per cent figure which proved so economically and politically 
constraining in subsequent years.6  
  Since 1992, French governments have translated ‘effective policy mix’ into increased 
national margin of manoeuvre in macroeconomic – and notably fiscal – policy. All French 
governments since 1996 publicly opposed the constraining features of the original Stability 
Pact and none undertook the kinds of structural reforms needed to ensure that France would 
meet the medium term goal of a budget 'close to balance or in surplus'. The Jospin 
Government in it latter years (especially from 1999) and the Raffarin UMP Government both 
prioritised tax cuts over deficit cuts. Major reductions in tax were one of the principal 
campaign pledges of President Chirac and the UMP in the 2002 presidential and legislative 
elections. Chirac spoke with a forked tongue for domestic public and European political elite 
audiences. While emphasising tax cuts in the domestic debate, he and the UMP also regularly 
confirmed France’s commitment to meeting the medium term SP goals. 
Repeated German failure to meet the 3 per cent deficit figure from 2002 gave the 
French greater political margin of manoeuvre on the SP rules. The Raffarin Government 
formed a pro-reform alliance with the Schröder Government. The French government then 
accepted the Schröder Government’s demands that the application of the SP’s Excessive 
                                                 
6 In 1991, France was one of the few EC member states to respect all five criteria and, until 
that date – apart from 1983 – since the Second World War, France had avoided a public 
spending deficit greater than 3 per cent. The 3 per cent deficit limit was first set by the French 
Socialist Government in the context of its abandonment of its Keyensian experiment of the 
early 1980s.  With a 3.1 per cent deficit in 1983, President Mitterrand resolved not to exceed 
3 per cent in the future. 
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suspension at the 25 November 2003 Ecofin meeting.7 Official French policy on the SP 
insisted that the non-application of the EDP did not amount to an abandonment of France’s 
commitment to the Pact (Le Monde, 26.11.2004). However, the Raffarin Government insisted 
upon a more flexible application that would – officially – take into consideration the 
economic situation facing a participating member state and – in practice – allow more scope 
for political bargaining and thus margin of manoeuvre for French (and other) governments. 
Both the Jospin and Raffarin governments let it be known that a reformulated Pact 
should take into consideration deficit spending on public investment (notably physical 
infrastructural and research spending) – eliminating this for total public deficit considerations 
– which would allow for greater margin of manoeuvre. This was most recently defended 
through a report published 18 November 2004 by economists in the Economic Analysis 
Council (Conseil d’analyse économique) attached to the Prime Minister’s office. Allied to the 
Schröder Government, the Raffarin Government insisted on discounting public spending on 
research – especially given the EU’s official (Lisbon) research spending objective of 3 per 
cent of total GDP by 2010. The Raffarin Government also accepted (Le Monde 3.12.04) the 
Schröder Government’s insistence that all national spending on EU engagements be taken 
into consideration when judging national deficits: thus allowing net contributors to the EU 
budget like Germany but also France more leeway in comparison to net recipients. With the 
largest total defence budget in the EU, President Chirac and the Raffarin Government also 
                                                 
7 Article 104.8 (TEC) states that ‘Where it establishes that there has been no effective action 
in response to its recommendations within the period laid down, the Council may make its 
recommendations public.’  Article 104.9 (TEC) states that: ‘If a Member State persists in 
failing to put into practice the recommendations of the Council, the Council may decide to 
give notice to the Member State to take, within a specified time-limit, measures for the deficit 
reduction which is judged necessary by the Council in order to remedy the situation.  In such 
a case, the Council may request the Member State concerned to submit reports in accordance 
with a specific timetable in order to examine the adjustment efforts of that Member State.’  
These provisions were not applied to Germany and France. 
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French governments – both left and right – supported a more flexible medium term target that 
did not insist upon balanced budgets, as in the original Pact, yet was still designed to reduce 
debt in the long term. The French wanted each country to have its own medium term objective 
that would in effect would increase government margin of manoeuvre by submitting the 
determination of this target exclusively to ministerial judgement and thus abandoning 
completely the automaticity enshrined as a central tenet in the Pact which arguably impeded 
the development of an appropriate policy mix for each Euro-zone member state.  Both the 
Jospin and Raffarin Governments were officially hostile (Treasury officials, interviews April 
and May 2005) to proposals to render the Pact more ‘symmetric’ by increasing the constraint 
on fiscal policy – forcing the further reduction of deficits – during periods of economic 
growth.  This constraint was considered politically unacceptable to governments wanting to 
ensure maximum margin of manoeuvre in fiscal policy. 
After lengthy and rather acrimonious debate in the Eurogroup, Ecofin and the 
European Council, on 20 March 2005, the EU member state governments reached an 
agreement on SP reform, containing the following changes to the existing rules: 
•  While the official deficit threshold will be maintained, there will be a derogation – 
allowing a member state to exceed temporarily the 3 per cent figure to a limited extent 
– in the event of slow economic growth (no precise figures being provided). 
•  A temporary (period of time not defined) deficit will not be declared excessive if the 
member state concerned devotes considerable public expenditure to one of several 
‘other relevant factors’ 1) investment; 2) research and development; 3) structural 
reforms (only those which have a long term impact on the solidity of public finances 
will be taken into account); 4) EU policy goals; 5) European unification; 6) 
international ‘solidarity’ (which the French insisted would include spending on both 
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categories.  Once the 3 per cent deficit limit is reached the Council and Commission 
will examine the extent to which spending on these ‘pertinent factors’ contribute to the 
deficit in question. 
•  A member state which has achieved a public spending surplus during periods of 
relatively strong economic growth and which has a relatively low debt burden will be 
treated more leniently  
•  A member state exceeding the 3 per cent threshold will obtain a delay of 3 years to 
bring its deficit down again.  The objective remains to bring the deficit below the 
threshold within a year following the launch of the EDP but a government can obtain a 
delay of a year if there are particular circumstances that should be taken into 
consideration (notably slow economic growth).   Before advancing to the sanctions 
procedure the Commission will prepare a report to determine whether a supplementary 
delay of a year should be allowed. 
•  Following the identification of an EDP by the Commission and the Council, a member 
state will have 6 months (not just the current 4) to propose corrective measures.   
•  As in the Commission’s recommendation, member states are to avoid pro-cyclical 
budgets in good times (when real growth is superior to potential growth) but there is to 
be no obligation for these member states to achieve a budget surplus. 
•  More effort will be demanded from member states with a relatively heavy debt burden 
which have not undertaken structural reforms. 
•  The mid-term objective of each member state will be determined with regard to two 
factors:  1) those member states with low debt levels and strong growth are allowed a 
medium term deficit of 1 per cent; 2) those member states with high debt levels and 
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is currently the case but this objective will be redefined every four years).  Member 
states which have not yet attained their medium term objective will have to reduce 
their structural deficit – depending upon the level of economic growth – by 0.5 per 
cent of GDP. 
The new spirit of the SP presented by the French Finance Minister Thierry Breton – ‘to help 
rather than to punish’ (Le Monde 22.3.2005) – the elimination of the elements of automaticity 
in the original pact and the introduction of considerable room for interpretation conform well 
to French intergovernmentalist preferences. They also reflect the ‘effective policy mix’ 
dimension in the French approach to economic governance.  There is an obvious tension 
between greater flexibility allowed in the application of the SP and the potential effectiveness 
of its sanction mechanisms.  There is also the potential for tension between this more flexible 
version of economic governance and EG as macroeconomic policy coordination. Under the 
new Pact, there is considerably greater scope for counterclaim in the event of non-compliance 
with existing rules, given that member states can justify their borrowing with reference to 
numerous factors.  Furthermore, the increased uncertainty that surrounds the determination of 
acceptable medium term balances will make it even more difficult for Ecofin to trigger 
sanctions against errant member states. 
  
2. Economic governance as interventionism 
The second version of EG that can be discerned in French government rhetoric and policy is 
more interventionist involving EU job creation strategies and infrastructure programmes. This 
could involve varying degrees of intervention in the context of the EU's employment and 
social chapters or in terms of EU sponsored investment. To the extent that intervention 
involves reflation and thus a direct challenge to the price stability goals of the ECB, this 
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governance explored below. 
  The French Socialists made this more interventionist version of economic governance 
a central element of their policy on EMU during the campaign prior to the June 1997 National 
Assembly elections.8 They and their Plural Left coalition partners forwarded European 
economic governance as a means to promote growth and employment, goals which were 
ostensibly given equal weight to the 'growth and stability' goals in the Amsterdam Treaty due 
to Prime Minister Jospin's insistence on parallel resolutions. Rhetorically, the construction of 
EG was linked to the establishment of a 'euro-social': an EU level economic and monetary 
policy mix that would more aggressively counterbalance or even directly challenge the 'sound 
money' policies pursued by the ECB. The Plural Left Government called for collective EU-
level interventionism to include both joint spending on major infrastructural projects and a 
high-profile EU employment strategy, that Jospin forced through at the June 1997 Amsterdam 
European Council, to involve regular ‘Jobs Summits’. However, the Plural Left Government's 
preferences in this area were not met: the Employment Chapter of the Amsterdam Treaty, the 
Luxembourg and Cardiff Jobs Summits of November 1997 and March 1998, and the Cologne 
and Lisbon Summits of June 1999 and March 2000 established a non-binding 'soft' or 'open' 
form of coordination that fell far short of the kind of intervention sought by the French.9 
                                                 
8 See Howarth (2002a & b); Pochet (1998). 
9 The Employment Chapter itself involved no additional spending or obligatory measures and 
emphasised a vision of job creation closer to that advocated by Tony Blair’s New Labour — 
with an emphasis placed on training and the adaptability of the work force as contributing to a 
‘flexible and competitive Europe’ — than the Plural Left vision of EU-level spending and 
intervention. The Luxembourg and Cardiff ‘job summits’ of November 1997 and March 
1998, and the Cologne and Lisbon summits of June 1999 and March 2000 established and 
reinforced a programme of employment policy coordination: best practice information 
sharing, pilot projects and non-binding job creation targets. This coordination fell far short of 
the Jospin Government’s initial proposals for the Luxembourg summit that included the 
establishment of specific binding national plans for the creation of twelve million jobs 
throughout the EU over the next five years, the coordination and regulation of employment 
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level and French Socialist ministers consistently stressed – if not exaggerated – the 
significance of developments in this area (Howarth 2002a/b).10 The Jospin Government also 
made a deliberately symbolic gesture de-emphasising the stability element of economic 
governance and emphasising government margin of manoeuvre: France was the only aspiring 
participant of EMU to fail officially to respect the 3 per cent deficit figure for its 1997 budget 
— the 3.1 figure announced demonstrated French pique at German insistence that the deficit 
criterion be respected for participation in EMU. However, the overriding objective of starting 
EMU by 1999 – the design of which the Germans would not allow to be altered – 
demonstrated the hollowness of the Jospin Government’s rhetoric. Socialist-led governments 
have not been alone in advocating this more interventionist form of economic governance.  In 
2003, the Raffarin UMP Government joined with the German Chancellor Schröder to launch a 
Franco-German growth initiative of 18 September 2003 and attacked the Commission for 
being excessive in its drive for budget cutting and ‘anti-industry’, pledging further tax cuts in 
both countries and 10 major jointly funded infrastructural projects (Le Monde, 19.9.2003).  
President Chirac has regularly called for EU-level and Franco-German projects which involve 
deficit spending to stimulate the economy and develop particular industrial sectors.  
 
3. Economic Governance as credibility and legitimacy building 
EG has also been perceived and advocated as a means to improve the credibility of ECB 
monetary policy.  This form of EG can link in with the price stability version of EG embodied 
by the Maastricht Treaty and SP rules by reinforcing the credibility of the ECB’s efforts to 
manage Euro-zone monetary policy.  Crucially, this form of EG concerns communication – 
                                                                                                                                                         
policy at the EU-level and even the necessary Commission approval on industrial 
redundancies and closures (‘Le Sommet de Tony Blair’, Le Monde, 23-24.11.1997). 
10 See Martine Aubry’s comments in ‘Le Sommet de Tony Blair’, Le Monde (23-24.11.1997). 
  17the coordination of different national government voices regarding ECB monetary policy and 
desirable economic policy.  There has been a problem of many voices making different 
pronouncements on ECB policy making. This version of EG has involved the creation of a 
single political interlocutor of the ECB, which focuses on maintaining good relations with the 
central bank and contributes to the improved coordination of the international representation 
of the Euro-zone. Thus, the emphasis is upon the effective operation of the intergovernmental 
/ political dimension of the Euro-zone. This version of EG is closely related to the fourth 
which has involved embedding the independent ECB in a political framework: to reinforce its 
democratic legitimacy and public accountability. This fourth version has provided a partial 
response to those who express concern for the problematic existence of a single currency 
without a single state.  Despite their rhetorical and real emphasis placed upon reinforced 
coordination, in their search for margin of manoeuvre French governments have done much to 
undermine this form of economic governance. 
Socialist Finance Minister Dominique Strauss Kahn succeeded in achieving a formal 
agreement on the creation of what he labelled the 'Euro-Council' (conseil de l'euro) in 
December 1997 which the Jospin Government widely presented as a manifestation of 
economic governance. This body was subsequently relabelled the Euro-X due to German 
opposition that the label Council incorrectly suggested that this new body had legal status. 
This body became the Euro-XI following the determination of the number of member states 
participating in EMU and was subsequently officially relabelled the Eurogroup during the 
French Council presidency during the second half of 2000. Leading French officials also 
made the exaggerated claim that the creation of the new Economics and Financial Committee, 
the rebaptised Monetary Committee, helped to reinforce the control of the Euro-XI over the 
economic framework in which monetary policy was made, thus forwarding the construction 
  18of EU economic governance.11  Emphasising the role of the Economic and Financial 
Committee was – as with the Eurogroup – important to the Jospin Government which sought 
to demonstrate and enhance the importance of intergovernmental decision-making in EMU as 
a counterbalance to supranational rules. 
  The French Council Presidency of the second half of 2000 had two specific goals with 
regard to the political dimension of the Euro-zone: improve the visibility of the then Euro-XI 
and improve economic policy coordination. Progress in both goals was limited during the 
French presidency but potentially significant. Regarding the first goal, the Jospin Government 
had failed in the French aim to give the Euro-XI a legal personality of its own. Thus all Euro-
XI agreements had still to be ratified by Ecofin. Also, Ecofin remained very much the most 
important body for coordination (including discussion of the Stability / Convergence 
Programmes and the BEPG which were also prepared by the ESCB members not participating 
in the Euro-zone and thus not attending the Euro-XI meetings). Nonetheless, the French 
scored a minor victory in convincing the Euro-zone governments to relabel the Euro-XI the 
Eurogroup. The French also succeeded in bringing an agreement to produce a clearer, 
published agenda for Eurogroup meetings, to have longer meetings, to discuss more current 
matters at them and to improve their communication output (notably through the organization 
of a press conference immediately after the Eurogroup meeting, prior to the Ecofin the 
                                                 
11 ‘On n'est plus très loin du gouvernement économique’, interview with Jean Lemierre in 
Libération, 13 January 1999. Jean Lemierre, former head of the French Treasury and the first 
president of the Economic and Financial Committee made such announcements to the French 
press upon the creation of the council at the start of 1999. However, the powers of the new 
Economic and Financial Committee did not reinforce those of the Euro-XI. Like the former 
Monetary Committee, this new body includes leading central bank officials and the Heads of 
national Treasuries. It incorporates the principal responsibilities of the former Monetary 
Committee, placing emphasis upon economic policy co-ordination (which explains the change 
in name). In June 1998, the Commission’s proposals to strengthen economic policy co-
ordination in the context of the new Committee and the Euro-XI, were rejected by the 
member states. Like its predecessor, the new Economic and Financial Committee is the 
principal body in which detailed negotiations and decisions take place, leaving Ecofin to 
ratify the decisions or to negotiate and make decisions in those situations in which the 
treasury officials and bank governors are not able to reach agreement.  See Puetter 2004. 
  19following day).12 With regard to Eurogroup-ECB relations, Laurent Fabius – unsuccessfully 
– sought the organisation of more frequent bilateral meetings between the presidents of the 
two bodies. The aim here was to improve the coordination of member state positions on ECB 
policy making and channel this through the Eurogroup to the ECB president. Fabius also 
blamed the weakness of the euro on the lack of strong political leadership in the Euro-zone, 
the absence of an EU equivalent to the American Secretary of the Treasury.13 He raised the 
idea of a Mr. Euro – previously introduced by the French – to be held by an individual over a 
period of several years and responsible, in conjunction with the Council presidency, for the 
international representation of the Euro-zone (an economic policy equivalent to the Mr. 
CFSP, the EU's foreign policy representative). With regard to the second goal of the French 
Council Presidency, there were no great strides towards tightened policy coordination.   
Moreover, the development of a common communications strategy appeared to stall with 
different publicly expressed views on a range of Euro-zone related matters including the 
decline of the euro and attacks on Duisenberg's competence as ECB president (see Howarth 
and Loedel 2005). 
While breaking the Pact’s rules and agreeing to suspend the EDP, the Raffarin 
Government nonetheless continued its efforts to reinforce the Eurogroup as the principal 
intergovernmental forum for Euro-zone coordination. With EU enlargement, the French see 
the Eurogroup as assuming even greater importance as an informal forum for discussion to 
counterbalance the potential dilution of French influence in the context of Ecofin meetings. 
The Franco-German proposal on the reinforcement of the Eurogroup to the EU Convention 
met with the objection of the euro-outsiders. The French sought to enable Ecofin to meet in a 
                                                 
12 This was very significant because it gave the Eurogroup the opportunity to make policy 
announcements prior to their confirmation by all EU finance ministers in Ecofin. 
13 Fabius, L., 'Donner plus de visibilité à l'euro 11 sera un axe fort de la présidence française'; 
Zecchini, L. and Lemaitre, P.H., 'La France veut renforcer le pouvoir du club de l'euro', Le 
Monde, 4.7.2001. 
  20forum consisting of only the ministers of finance of the Euro-zone member states, thus 
enabling them to make legally binding decisions without the approval of the Euro-outsiders. 
These proposals were not included in the Draft Treaty (2003) – not only because of the 
objections of the Euro-outsiders but also because of the problematic precedent that it would 
set for the organisation of other councils of ministers – and the French have had to content 
themselves with the limited reinforcement of the Eurogroup including the creation of a Mr. 
Euro who was to chair meetings for two years and provide a political face to the Euro-zone 
(Convention Working Group on Economic Government, Report 2002; Draft Treaty 
Establishing a Constitution for Europe 2003). Even without Treaty ratification, at the start of 
2004, the Luxembourg Prime Minister and Finance Minister, Jean-Claude Junker, was 
appointed as the first two-year head of the Euro-group. 
 
4.  Economic Governance an explicit challenge to the ECB's goals and goal-setting and 
operational independence 
Finally, French politicians have challenged explicitly both the goals and independence of the 
ECB. There are four roots to French opposition to central bank independence required by the 
German imposed design for EMU (Howarth 2001): the French republican tradition; the belief 
that control over economic and monetary policy should not be separated; the perception — 
rooted in the history of French political economy — that low inflationary economic policies 
can be maintained by democratically elected officials, guided by enlightened bureaucrats and 
advisers (notably those from the French Treasury and, in particular, the elite corps of 
Financial Inspectors); and power considerations within the French administration. None of the 
leading French political parties supported the concept of central bank independence until 1991 
either at the national or European level (Balleix-Benerjee 1997). The Neo-Gaullist RPR was 
opposed for nationalistic reasons and sought the maintenance of Council control over a future 
  21European monetary policy. The Socialist party placed stress on social goals and the 
appropriate policy mix. Moreover – and surprisingly – the UDF confederation supported only 
a more cautious, evolutionary approach – although one of its more pro-European components 
came out strongly in favour of central bank independence.  
Despite this tradition of opposition, following the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty 
the large majority of mainstream political leaders either defended central bank independence 
and the ECB’s goals or abstained from comment. However, since the start of EMU’s Stage 
Three in 1999 and, in particular, since the start of the economic slowdown in 2001 the 
antagonistic opinions of influential advisers and leading politicians alike have been heard. On 
23 January 2002, Pascal Lamy, the Socialist French commissioner for trade and Jean Pisani-
Ferry, then the head of Prime Minister Jospin's Economic Analysis Council (Conseil 
d’analyse économique), published (in a 'personal capacity') a pamphlet calling for the 
Eurogroup to be assigned the responsibility for setting the inflation target that the ECB is 
expected to meet (Lamy & Pisani-Ferry 2002). The authors argue that the ECB's pursuit of 
low inflation has been too restrictive and has hindered economic growth in the Euro-zone. 
The European monetary policy model should be re-established along the lines of fiscal-
monetary authority relations in Britain, Denmark, Sweden and New Zealand, where the 
Treasury sets the inflation target that the central bank is expected to follow.14 The authors 
also argue that the British target of 2-3 per cent, set by the government, has proved its merit in 
comparison to the more restrictive 2 per cent set by the Governing Council of the European 
Central Bank, with its singular objective of price stability. The authors note that ECB's 
structure was determined by the need to reassure the German public that it would be as tough 
on inflation as the Bundesbank. The changed economic conditions since the start of EMU – 
                                                 
14 L'Europe de nos volontés, Plon, 2002. The pamphlet almost certainly had the blessing of 
Prime Minister Jospin, with an eye to the upcoming French presidential and National 
Assembly elections. Lamy and Pisani-Ferry likewise challenged the logic behind the 
continued application of the Stability Pact's 3 per cent budget deficit criterion. 
  22especially in Germany – required a different approach to monetary policy. Only reform along 
British lines would enable a more flexible monetary policy that could better respond to the 
economic downturn in most of the Euro-zone.  
  Several leading French politicians have also called for the transformation of the ECB’s 
goals. The sound money core of the EMU project and the independence of the ECB was an 
object of attack by the Jospin Socialist-led Government in its early months. Leaders in the 
Raffarin and de Villepin UMP governments have been similarly critical. On 14 July 2004, in 
his annual televised Bastille Day speech, President Chirac chose to focus upon the need to 
reform the mission of the ECB in order to qualify the pursuit of low inflation – implying that 
ECB policy contributed to sluggish economic growth in the largest Euro-zone economies. As 
Finance Minister, Nicolas Sarkozy called for the ECB to adopt a Federal Reserve-style target 
that includes economic growth (Financial Times, 11.6.2004) and as the UMP’s 2007 
presidential candidate he attacked ECB’s focus on low inflation. The ambition of all 
Europeans, he argued, ‘should be to redefine the principles and the rules of economic and 
monetary union by carving them in a humanist and social dimension that is so dearly lacking 
in Europe’ (Euroactiv.com 23.2.2007).15 Proposal 89 of Ségolène Royal’s 2007 presidential 
electoral programme calls for the inclusion of an employment creation objective in the ECB’s 
Statute.16 Several leading politicians and 2007 presidential candidates – including Sarkozy, 
de Villepin and Royal – have also made veiled attacks on the ECB’s goal-setting 
independence (see Le Monde 9, 19 and 22.12.2006). In December 2006, when criticising the 
                                                 
15 ‘Sarkozy wants “protective EU” to offset globalisation’, Euroactiv.com, Friday 23.2.2007, 
updated Wednesday 28.2.2007,  http://www.euractiv.com/en/elections/sarkozy-wants-
protective-eu-offset-globalisation/article-161948, accessed on 10 March 2007. 
16 The Socialist candidate appears not to have noticed that the ECB’s secondary goal is 
presently economic growth and employment creation. 
  23ECB’s decision to raise its interest rate, Royal insisted that the bank be ‘submitted to political 
decisions’ because it is not its job ‘to order [commander] the future of our economies’.17
 
Conclusion 
The Raffarin Government’s policy on Stability Pact reform was consistent with French policy 
positions on EU-level economic governance over the past fifteen years. French governments 
have sought to reform the restrictive rules of the price stability function of economic 
governance (the Maastricht Treaty and SP rules) but they could tolerate them as long as they 
were not rigidly enforced. These restrictive rules have been most explicitly challenged in the 
context of electoral contests: thus the positioning of the Plural Left coalition in the 1997 
legislative elections and the Chiracian Right in the 2002 presidential and legislative elections. 
Economic governance as tightened macro-economic policy coordination has been a desired 
goal as long as most of this coordination remained ‘soft’ and retained a broadly – if not 
actively – interventionist character emphasising growth and job-creation in line with the goals 
established in the Lisbon strategy. Economic governance as the explicit elimination of the 
ECB’s goal-setting and operational independence has only occasionally been a stated goal of 
French governing politicians since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, which may reflect the 
recognition of the unlikelihood of such a reform. A more regular feature of French 
government policy announcements has been the extension of some kind of political control in 
macroeconomic policy making that effectively qualifies the bank’s ‘sound money’ emphasis.  
Yet French governments have never spelled out the institutional arrangements and 
decision making procedures whereby this political control would be achieved. The 
reinforcement of the role of the Eurogroup in Euro-zone macro-economic policy coordination 
has been a French objective for over a decade. French governments have advocated giving the 
                                                 
17 The precise wording that the Socialist 2007 presidential candidate used was ‘soumise à des 
décisions politiques’ (Le Monde, 22.12.2006) 
  24body a treaty-recognised status and power to make decisions. However, beyond the reinforced 
status of this intergovernmental body, French governments have failed to clarify precisely 
how macro-economic policy coordination would be reinforced. Indeed, the most common 
feature of French discourse on EG has been the absence of any concrete proposal of 
transferring real economic policy competences from the national to the European level. 
Indeed, it might be argued that French efforts with regard to the reinforced status and role of 
the Eurogroup stem principally from the restrained, informal and secretive features of this 
body (Puetter 2004). These features ensure a flexible application of the rules and a politically 
sensitive margin of manoeuvre, thus well reflecting the paradox – indeed inherent confusion – 
of French policy on economic governance that is both intergovernmental and dirigiste in 
nature.  In terms of the Europeanization of French policy, EG has brought about minimal ‘top-
down’ ‘transformation’ despite the early ‘pace-setting’ efforts by the German. Since 1993, but 
in particular since 1999, French governments have engaged a kind of ‘pace-setting’ of their 
own to shape a more acceptable economic governance that maximises margin of manoeuvre 
in the context of Monetary Union. Yet French ‘pace-setting’ is ultimately confused because of 
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